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 Abstract 
The State exists to deliver security and welfare to citizens.  One of the principal functions of the State 
is to enhance welfare through the production of legal regimes.  Law contributes to welfare in many 
ways, one of which is in its contacts with markets.  In this chapter, we trace the evolution of the role of 
law in the private sphere, with special attention to EU law.  Our thesis is that the State is in a process 
of evolution from a Nation State to a Market State.  Looking at private law confirms this evolution. 
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FROM THE NATION STATE TO THE MARKET: THE EVOLUTION OF 
EU PRIVATE LAW 
Part I: The State1 
The State2 exists to deliver security and welfare to its citizens. The "State" is not a static entity. In the 
last five hundred years, the State has evolved through five distinct forms, which are properly 
characterized as "constitutional orders." As the State evolves, the grounds of its legitimacy vis-a-vis 
the nation changes. States produce legal systems consistent with the demands of legitimacy. As the 
grounds for the legitimacy of the State changes, so too does its legal system.3 In this article, we argue 
that the evolution of the State from a Nation State to a Market State4 can be seen at the level of EU 
private law doctrine. We use European Private Law Regimes to make the case for understanding and 
illustrating this evolution. 
Over the course of the last five hundred years, the State has evolved through a number of 
configurations. While the Peace of Westphalia is often identified as the point of origin for the State, 
we agree with those who locate the origins of the State in the mid-seventeenth century.5 As the State 
evolves over time, its constitutive features change both in themselves and in relation to one another. At 
all times, the most important aspect of the evolution of the State is the degree to which the State 
responds to the demands of the nation6 in the course of legitimizing itself. 
The State has two faces, an inner and an outer. The outer dimension of the State is comprised of two 
principal features: strategy and trade. At all times, states have a strategic relationship to other states, 
the most basic of which are peace and war. Trade is the second dimension of the outer face of the 
State. Trade ideology (e.g., mercantilism or comparative advantage) follows the constitutional order of 
the society of states in that each form of the State is complemented by a particular trade regime.  
The inner face of the State is law and welfare. With respect to welfare, the modern nation-state 
provides support and protection for the nation. Additionally, the State improves the lives of citizens 
through law. The story of the nation-state is one of the rise of law and regulation as the means for 
betterment of the daily lives of the citizenry. 
"Statecraft" embodies the outer and the inner faces of the State. Our argument is that these two 
dimensions of Statecraft interact with one another over time, and that the legal regimes produced by 
states must be structured so as to accord with the ethos of the State. 
                                                     
1 Although the text is a joint production, the prime responsibility for Part I lies with Dennis Patterson, for Part II with Hans-
W. Micklitz. 
2 We use the word "state" in two different senses. When we write "State," we are referring to the conceptual political entity 
that has evolved in the Western world over roughly the last five hundred years. See J.S. McClelland, A History of 
Western Political Thought 280 (Routledge, 1996)  at 280 (dating the birth of the modern state at 1500). The State is 
manifested in many territorially and politically distinct "states," like Italy or the Republic of Latvia. When  refer to these 
individual states,  refer to them as a "state." For discussion of the various phases of the State's development, and their 
relation to a variety of constitutional orders, see Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of 
History (Knopf, New York, 2002), at 69-347. 
3  These ideas are elaborated in more detail in Dennis Patterson and Ari Afilalo, The New Global Trading Order (CUP: 
2008).  
4 The legitimacy of the market-State is grounded in its ability to provide economic opportunity for the citizenry.  This is its 
purpose and its ethos. 
5 See Bobbitt (2002) and Martin Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State, p. vii (University Press, Cambridge, 1999). 
6 The "nation" is an ethnographic construct or concept. 
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Our theory posits that the inner constitutional dimension of the State, law, is directly linked to the 
outer face of the State, that the inner constitution of the State varies from one epochal manifestation to 
the next, and that the interaction between the inner and outer faces of the State ultimately brings about 
transformative patterns that, over time, usher in the next era of Statecraft.  
The inner face of the State is law and “welfare.” We understand welfare capaciously as both 
subventions by the State as well as the production of legal regimes designed to improve the lives of 
citizens. The latter is what we term “regulatory welfare”. Regulatory welfare refers to the regulation of 
the economic and social aspects of the State. Health, labor, environmental regulations, resource 
conservation, worker safety, competition laws, consumer and investor protection, are examples of 
regulatory welfare. We call the subvention part of welfare “entitlements welfare.” It encompasses the 
various regimes adopted by European states to ensure minimum standards of living for their subjects. 
These include unemployment benefits, retirement, health insurance, minimum income guarantees, 
housing aid, aid to families with children, education, and other welfare tools adopted by European 
states to ensure that their nation will not fall below a minimal safety net level. 
“Statecraft” embodies the outer and the inner faces of the State. Our theory posits that the inner 
constitutional dimension of the State, law, is directly linked to the outer face of the State; that the inner 
constitution of the State varies from one epochal manifestation to the next; and that the interaction 
between the inner and outer faces of the State ultimately brings about transformative patterns that, 
over time, usher in the next era of Statecraft.7 Thus, the state-nation’s solidification enterprise, 
drawing on its subjects to consolidate the metropolis, wound up establishing a distinct “nation” that 
became associated with the state and its boundaries. This nation would become the foundational 
interlocutor of the nation-state, and the legitimating enterprise of the State would be to provide for its 
welfare. 
In this essay, we seek to understand the European private law enterprise in light of a theory of 
Statecraft that views the State as undergoing successive epochal transformations. This theory holds 
that, in each era, a prevailing form of the State operates characterized by foundational features that 
define the nature of its internal law and its relations with other states. We review the historical and 
legal background of the European collectivity in light of our Statecraft theory, and explain how 
Statecraft sheds light and insight into the political, legal and institutional evolution of Europe and its 
crises, both past and present. 
 
                                                     
7 Cooper writes: “The kind of world we have depends on the kind of states that compose it: for the pre-modern world, 
success is empire and failure is chaos. For the modern, success entails managing the balance of power and failure means 
falling back into war or empire. For the postmodern state, success means openness and  cooperation.” Robert Cooper, 
The Breaking of Nations, p. 76. (Atlantic Books, 2003). 
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Pre-Modern Era: No Possible Europe 
We posit that the pre-modern era started with the French Revolution, spanned the Industrial 
Revolution, and ended with World War I. In this age of Statecraft, the State focused on its own 
consolidation. Internally, the pre-modern era involved a foundational laissez-faire policy coupled with 
the growth of a legal system designed to protect private property and contract rights. Externally, the 
State adhered principally to a zero-sum game intended to amass wealth. Taken together, these policies 
had the design and purpose of strengthening the industrial base of the developing states.  
The state-nation8 legitimated itself by bringing unity out of diversity. It arose from the unification into 
one entity of largely unrelated territories, such as dukedoms, feudal territories, and princely states. The 
state-nation founded a single entity within discrete boundaries. Economically, it saw the rise of capital 
investment in the industrial base. Its ethos was to increase the power of the emerging sovereign. The 
internal legal system of the state-nation enabled its essential purpose. The state-nation adopted an 
economic legal structure designed to protect contractual and private property, rather than to extend 
entitlements to its subjects. Legal codes such as the Napoleonic Code were drafted.9 They protected 
the expectations of capital holders, and they did so by ensuring that in the common cycles of “boom-
and-bust” policies that later in history came to be known as “Keynesian” did not interfere with the free 
evolution of the market.  
Another way to conceptualize this era of Statecraft is to think of it as a “minimal welfare” 
constitutional era. A regime of entitlements welfare was inconsistent with the protection of capital. 
Industrialization and the concentration of capital required a freer market than a sophisticated system of 
welfare entitlements would permit. The same result obtained for regulatory welfare. Here, as well, the 
state-nation did not legitimize itself by providing protection to its nation. It had not even yet generated 
the concept of a nation. Instead, it drew on its subjects to amass resources and strengthen itself and, in 
the process, created the unified State resting on the nation that characterized the 20th century. In that 
context, regulatory systems like labor or consumer protection, environmental or resource conservation 
(generally, any of the 20th century administrative laws that we are familiar with) were not part of the 
internal legal fabric of the states. They would have burdened and hampered the solidification of the 
emerging industrial concerns at a time when the State derived its legitimacy from the protection of this 
very process. 
Externally, the state-nation followed trade and strategic foundational policies that furthered a similar 
purpose: the consolidation of the state-nation. The state-nations of Europe colonized foreign territories 
and drew upon their resources to bolster their own commercial and industrial base.10 These foreign 
territories were viewed as resources with respect to which they were in competition with their 
neighbors. The colonial map of Africa bears witness to these struggles. It was comprised of states that 
carved through traditional tribal boundary lines, lumping together ethnic groups that historically had 
never been part of the same polity, reflecting territorial struggles and compromises among England, 
                                                     
8 The state-nation is the constitutional manifestation of a state characterized by a mobilization of a nation (a national, 
ethnocultural group) to benefit the State. This form of the State, exemplified by Napoleonic France, dominated Europe 
and America in the nineteenth century and ultimately gave rise to the modern nation-state with the advent of World War 
I. For a general description, see Bobbitt (2002) 144-204. 
9 Alexander I. Grab, Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe, pp.50-51 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). Peter A.J. van den 
Berg, The politics of European codification: a history of the unification of law in France, Prussia, the Austrian Monarchy 
and the Netherlands, pp. 4-5, 206 (Europe Law Pub., 2007). 
10 Francois Crouzet, A History of European Economy, 1000-2000, pp. 50-54, 165 (The University press of Virginia, 2001). 
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France, Belgium, Germany, Italy and other European colonial powers.11 The European state-nations 
also followed a predominantly mercantilist policy, seeking to sell as much as possible and buy as little 
as possible from their trading interlocutors.12 
In this environment, there was no foundation for a European Union. Each entity comprising the whole 
dedicated itself to consolidating its own base. The very ethos of the state-nation was antithetical to 
unity. States could not engage in an economic and strategic zero-sum game to strengthening 
themselves while at the same time seeking collaboration. Whether in the colonial battle field or in the 
realm of economic competition, the nature of Statecraft called for mustering the available resources to 
build a unified state.  
The state-nation needed to build its industrial and commercial base. The state-nation process achieved 
that goal and, in the course of its enterprise, also created a nation associated with its physical 
boundaries. The Schuman Declaration may be read to perceptively understand that the European 
enterprise was not a matter of destiny. It described the failures of the nations of Europe, after World 
War I, to begin creating a unified whole. It did not argue, as Fukuyama or Ricardo did, that history had 
ended because we had reached a timeless and ultimate state of democratic rule or of economic 
organization. Instead, it acknowledged that the tragedy of Europe lay in its failure to recognize that, 
after World War I, a “united Europe was not created and we had war”.13 It recognized that in the post-
World War I era, Europeans adopted a Treaty which reflected the state-nation era values of 
competition, zero-sum game, lack of cooperation, and domination. The result was a foundational 
rupture between the architecture of a basic treaty defining the relations among European states and the 
Statecraft of the age. 
World War II was a catalyst to the adoption of the treaties and programs that shaped the world in the 
second half of the 20th century. Those treaties, as we explain below, are consistent with a nation-state, 
modern age of Statecraft. The GATT was signed at Bretton Woods and ushered in the trade 
liberalization enterprise, rejecting mercantilism and protectionism.14 It “embedded liberalism” in that 
each state participant enjoys, at least in theory, the sovereign right to establish and operate a welfare 
system of its choice, and at the same time removed barriers to trade and create a more efficient trading 
system. France could stay France and maintain programs ranging from universal education to the 
supply of subsidized metro tickets to large families, all the while participating in a liberalized system 
of trade that generated more global resources to share. The Marshall Plan ensured that the European 
trading partners had sufficient economic strength to be meaningful commercial interlocutors for the 
United States. The new modern order relied on balance of powers, alongside liberalized trade and 
integration among sovereign equals, and the Marshall Plan fostered European powers so as to bring 
about greater balance.  
Europe, because of its unique suffering during World War II, engaged in a deeply integrationist 
enterprise that went well beyond what any other free trade area would aspire to accomplish. 
Nevertheless, its roots can be traced to a modern enterprise, albeit amplified by historical 
circumstances. 
 
                                                     
11 Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, p.21 (Avon Books, New York, 1991). H.L.Wesseling, Imperialism and 
Colonialism, Essays on the History of European Expansion, pp.12-20 (Greenwood Press, 1997). On colonization of 
Africa see also Vincent B Khapoya, The African Experience: An Introduction, (Prentice Hall, 2009). 
12 Peter Mathias and Sidney Polland, The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Volume VIII, p. 103 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1989). 
13 The Schuman Declaration (Paris, 9 May 1950),  http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm  
14 After the initiation of Bretton Woods, international trade proliferated six-fold from 1948-1973. See 
http://econ2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ355/choi/bre.htm 
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Europe: The Early Years 
By the end of World War I, after the adoption of the Treaty of Versailles, the European states had 
graduated to the early stages of the nation-state era. During that era, the State would marshal its power 
to provide for the welfare of its nation. At that time, the seeds that had been sown for the 
establishment of a European collectivity based on free trade and common political institutions had 
yielded a collectivity of states ready to engage in the European endeavor.15 The European Union was 
ready to proceed as a project of integration of discrete nations into a whole that would be inextricably 
bound but would at the same time respect national sovereignty.16  
The historical basis of Europe is succinctly expressed in the Schuman Declaration: “A united Europe 
was not achieved, and we had war”. By binding France and Germany to a union and partnership for 
coal and steel, the resources of war, the community of Europe would make war not only “unthinkable 
but materially impossible.” Europe would not be achieved overnight. It would focus on concrete 
achievements and, in leaps and bounds, become a polity that could in time fairly be labeled as the 
“United States of Europe.” In the meantime, foundational treaties were designed to shelter the 
sovereign right of the Member State to engage in regulatory and entitlements welfare. 
European exceptionalism joined Statecraft to create a highly integrated Europe. The European Treaties 
went well beyond the free trade treaties (e.g., the GATT) that were adopted after World War II. They 
included a commitment to a single, tariff-free market and the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade. 
The GATT, on the other hand, contemplated a gradual reduction of the applicable tariffs through a 
“binding system” that capped the tariff each state could apply in any product category, and a most-
favored-nation system that (save for regional commitments) required that the lowest tariff extended by 
the GATT members to any trading partner be extended to all. The European Community, as successor 
to the European Coal and Steel Community, also established common institutions mirroring those of 
the ECSC that the GATT and other integration systems did not come close to achieving. As explained 
in greater depth below, Europe attempted to replicate the institutional structure of modern liberal 
democracies by instituting legislative bodies, an executive-like agency, and a constitutional court. The 
Treaties also gave individuals a right of access to national courts to enforce rights granted under 
European law.17 
While the European Treaties were bolder and more ambitious than any international treaty in force at 
the time, this overall design still provided a substantial level of protection of the Member States’ 
ability to legislate both regulatory and entitlements welfare. Each Member State could, to a certain 
extent, remain a “black box” in which it enjoyed freedom to determine how best to support the welfare 
of its nations, free from interference by European law.18  
The initial challenges of Europe involved the familiar questions attendant to the integration of discrete 
nation-states into a single market. When borders are open to trade, although formally regulatory 
welfare remains unaffected, the disparate regulatory levels travel along with the goods. 
European judicial and political institutions reacted to this challenge of integration with a significantly 
greater pro-trade oriented approach than other integration projects that did not feature the European 
                                                     
15 Anthony Sutcliffe, An Economic and Social History of Western Europe Since 1945, at 106 (Longman, New York 1996). 
16 Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law. Cases and materials., pp.7-9 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010); Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, pp. 9-16 (Duke University 
Press 5th ed., 2003). 
17 See Case 14/83 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891. 
18 For quite some time the constitutional courts of the Member states contested the European Court of Justice’s position on 
fundamental rights issues. Thus, in 1970 the German and Italian constitutional courts stated they would not apply 
provisions of EU Law that failed to respect the fundamental rights and values set out in their national constitutions. See in 
this respect Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540 and Frontini v. Ministero delle Finanze [1974] 
CMLR 386. 
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commitment to creation of a new legal order.19 In its early decisions, the European Court of Justice 
made certain that any measure that actually or potentially, directly or indirectly, hindered trade, would 
be subject to its judicial scrutiny.20 In all cases, barriers to trade arose out of the disparity among 
national regulations.  
The unbridled integrationist purpose of the European Court of Justice thrust it in the midst of a 
European review of national measures. At the same time, the Court found that European law would 
have direct effect as long as it was clear and unconditional.21 It implied a supremacy clause in the 
Treaties.22 It also found an implicit “Bill of Rights” in the common traditions of the Member States, 
thereby assuaging the national judicial fears that an all-powerful European law would trump national 
constitutional human rights provisions. As Professor Weiler observed in his seminal article “The 
Transformation of Europe”23, the political institutions of the Member States (in particular, France) did 
not expect that the Treaties would be interpreted in such an aggressive integrationist manner  
As we explain below, every modern trade-liberalizing system ultimately erodes sovereignty and sows 
the seeds of its own demise. Modern Statecraft is based on sovereignty and the notion that liberalizing 
trade can be done without infringing sovereignty. While each trade system will, by definition, seek to 
balance these conflicting values (often choosing sovereignty-protection), over time, the diffuseness 
and interloped nature of liberalized integrated markets erodes the black box nature of the participating 
states. This destroys the conditions that made modern trade interaction desirable, and necessitates a 
new system. 
Owing to its unique history, Europe witnessed this phenomenon very early (at the height of the 
modern era), hence the significance and political sensitivity of the Luxembourg crisis.24 The Member 
States rejected the combination of aggressive economic constitutional jurisprudence, passage to less-
than-unanimity voting, and closure of selective exit through hardening of law because they could not 
fathom a situation where other States would outvote them and dictate welfare policy. The sensitivity to 
welfare and sovereignty, however, was no accident: it was a unique product of the modern age. As we 
explain later, the Member States had no issue abandoning the Luxembourg compromise whereby each 
State could veto European legislation that it disliked later in the 20th century, because by then they had 
graduated to a post-modern market-state age. The protective reflex that led to the Luxembourg 
accords, thereby saving the European enterprise, stemmed from fundamental nation-state 
constitutional principles: preservation of regulatory welfare, sovereign right to legislate in that area 
free of international and supranational interference, and sovereign limitation on the import of foreign 
standards into the domestic market.25  
The closure of selective exit was unpalatable because it would have established a foundational system 
more characteristic of the market-state, where sovereignty is subordinate to international measures to 
solidify and protect markets. The European plan to install such a system was scheduled to take effect 
                                                     
19 See Michelle P. Egan, Constructing a European Market, ch.4 (Oxford University Press, 2001). 
20 See Case 41/74 Van Duyn v.Home Office [1974] ECR 1337. 
21 See Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue 
Administratio, [1963] ECR 1. 
22 See Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 (6/64); C-106/77, Simmenthal II [1978] ECR 629; C-106/89 Marleasing 
[1991] ECR I-7321. 
23 Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 100, No. 8, Symposium: International 
Law. (June, 1991). 
24 N. Piers Ludlow, De-commissioning the empty chair crisis: The community institutions and the crisis of 1965-6, pp. 79-
96, in Wallace, Helen and Winand, Pascaline and Palayret, Jean-Marie, (eds.) Visions, votes and vetoes :The empty chair 
crisis and the Luxembourg compromise forty years on (Peter Lang, Brussels, Belgium 2006). 
25 See Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, above, at p. 2457. 
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in the thick of the modern nation-state era. This was inconsistent with the legitimacy demands on the 
State, and with its need to provide welfare unimpeded by international regulatory schemes. 
 
Democracy Deficit 
Statecraft also explains the institutional challenges that arose in the formative years of Europe, and 
how those challenges were met. In the modern nation-state age, the global collectivity of states agreed 
to open up borders to trade, all the while preserving in theory each individual state’s ability to 
establish the welfare system of its choice.26 France could remain France and extend half-price metro 
tickets to families with many children, England could continue to adhere to cradle-to-grave programs, 
Japan could engage in indicative planning, and the United States could tax and spend.  
Europe had to adopt a political decision-making structure for crafting laws that would harmonize the 
single market and that, in light of the decisions of the European Court on constitutional issues, would 
be binding throughout the Member States. This was another manifestation of European 
exceptionalism. One of its initial foundational challenges, then, was how to design those institutions. 
Europe quickly fell into the trap of trying to resolve this issue by replicating the political institutions of 
the nation-state attempting, in effect, to create a European “super-nation-state,” one that would protect 
the welfare of the European collectivity. Europe adapted the institutions with which the Member 
States were familiar. Where it acted through its institutions for the whole, Europe would replicate the 
European modern liberal democratic state. 
This is what led to what came to be known as the “European democracy deficit”. The democracy 
deficit debate often took the form of a critique of Europe’s failure to adopt institutions that better 
replicated those of modern liberal democracies. 
Europe also sought to replicate the modern constitutional protections of minority rights. After it 
announced its supremacy jurisprudence, the European Court assuaged the fears of national judiciaries 
and other interlocutors by implying a Bill of Rights in the European treaties, which included none.27 
The fundamental rights guaranteed by this jurisprudence would be inspired by the common values of 
the Member States.  
However, as more insightful observers commented, this nation-state reflex to determine welfare by 
majority or other democratically-endorsed voting quorum missed the core question of integration in 
the modern nation-state era: how to craft rules for the whole all the while respecting national 
sovereignty. Whether an alliance of national members of Parliament voted down another set of 
Member State representatives directly elected by the people, or whether this happened through a vote 
of the executives delegated to the Council, the integrated area would overrule national choices that 
were the essence of Statecraft in action in the modern age. No matter how much representative 
democracy was infused in the system, the malaise caused by the democracy deficit would not 
dissipate.28 
 
                                                     
26 See John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic 
order, pp. 385-388. International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, International Regimes (Spring, 1982). 
27 Joseph H.H Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the Role of the European Court of Justice in the 
Protection of Fundamental Human Rights within the Legal Order of the European Communities, p. 1105. Washington 
Law Review, Vol. 61, Issue 3 (July, 1986). 
28 See id., at pp. 2466-2474. 
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From Luxembourg to Maastricht: Accession to the Age of the Market State 
The Luxembourg crisis both saved and tempered the integration enterprise of Europe. Bargaining “in 
the shadow of the veto”29 sheltered sovereignty but slowed the adoption of European integration 
measures. By the 1980s and 1990s, however, Europe picked up speed and moved rapidly ahead with 
the harmonization or approximation of its laws on a larger scale. Complementing the more perfect 
unification of its single market, Europe then proceeded to adopt a single currency, European 
citizenship, an agreement for the removal of border controls among Member States belonging to the 
Schengen zone, and other institutional and political breakthroughs that pushed Europe significantly 
along the integration road. 
We posit that, while other factors surely contributed to it, the acceleration of the integration of Europe 
was made possible by the accession to the age of the market-state. Nation-states are bound to evolve 
into market-states over time. Their inner ethos, welfare for the nation, corresponds to their outer face: 
integration through trade while preserving sovereignty. Trade in goods and services inevitably leads to 
capital flows and interloping ownership of global assets. This is true especially in an integrated area 
like Europe, where the movement of capital and people is ensured and encouraged to a much greater 
extent than in other trade regulatory schemes. The integrated area will then tend to become more 
diffuse and use its “black box aggregation character.” Industries and other commercial sectors will 
tend to be dissociated from the nation. Regulatory welfare will be disrupted by the growing import of 
goods manufactured under other regulatory conditions. In time, jobs and production will be 
increasingly outsourced.  
In this environment, the State loses control over regulatory and entitlements welfare. Traditional tools 
such as exchange rates become regulated by the market to a much greater extent than by the State. 
States gradually lose their ability to incur national debt because foreign debt holders gradually displace 
nationals. The free flow of goods carries with it disparate regulation. With the aging of a population 
that boomed after World War II with renewed birth rate and immigration, budgets for entitlements 
welfare come under excessive strain. In turn, the nature of sovereignty changes as the ethos of the 
State shifts away from providing top-down regulatory and entitlements welfare to fostering and 
preserving market conditions where economic opportunity can be maximized. 
This is the legitimating ethos of the market-state. Instead of providing top-down welfare, the post-
modern Market State unleashes its power to ground the market and maximize the enablement of 
economic opportunity for its citizens. This may translate into legislation that is similar to that which 
obtained in the nation-state. Securities disclosure or bank capitalization laws, for example, protect 
consumer welfare while fostering market stability. Even entitlements such as aid to education may 
belong to both ages, although vouchers and other market-based solutions may be more appropriate to 
the market-state era. In the changed post-modern globalized terrain, market failures in one segment of 
the market can travel rapidly to threaten and infect other segments across borders. The collectivity of 
states must dedicate itself to create conditions that stabilize and solidify the enlarged market. The 
process is not unlike that of the state-nation; even if it infringes on what would have been viewed as 
unassailable welfare sovereign rights in the middle of the 20th century, it is necessary to maintain the 
architecture of the 21st. This is the pattern that Europe followed.  
We place the emergence of the market-state toward the end of the 20th century, when global 
economies started to integrate to such an extent that black box Statecraft eroded enough to give way to 
a more diffuse, interloped set of market-states whose ethos focused on the preservation of the market 
and the maximization of opportunity, rather than top-down welfare entitlements. Europe’s expansion 
into market-state regulatory territory coincided with this timetable. In effect, “[i]n the late 1980s the 
Single European Act was passed to facilitate the creation of a single market by streamlining the 
method by which harmonization laws were made. These laws were designed to complete the single 
                                                     
29 See Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, above, at p. 2450. 
From the Nation State to the Market: The Evolution of EU Private Law 
9 
market by the end of 1992.30 Prior to 1993, over 300 measures were passed into law”.31 Thereafter, 
hundreds more measures were adopted, thereby bringing the regulatory welfare landscape of Europe 
into substantial conformity. This was the birth of what we later call European Regulatory Private law.  
The Treaty of Maastricht built upon the SEA by completing the single market and establishing the 
European Monetary Union in three successive stages. The Treaty requires the Member States to 
“ensure coordination of their economic policies” (a significant move to which we will come back later 
in this essay), and to “provide for multilateral surveillance of this coordination.” In addition, the States 
“are subject to financial and budgetary discipline”. Monetary unification was an extremely significant 
step in the evolution of Europe, which was also consistent with accession to the market-state. The 
objective of monetary policy is to create a single currency and to ensure this currency's stability by 
maintaining price stability, economic policy coordination, and respect for the market economy.32 
The convergence of economic policy that came with monetary unification goes to the heart of welfare 
entitlements. Although Europe did not adopt a common fiscal policy, it did not infringe on the welfare 
system of Member States in that it left them free to craft social security and health, education, 
retirement and other mainstays of welfare as they saw fit. But entry to the Euro zone demanded that 
participating Member States adhere to specified macroeconomic goals.33 These European requirements 
made sense in a market-state age where protecting market opportunity becomes the ethos of the State 
and an animating principle of the relationship among states. 
 
                                                     
30 Article 13 of the Single European Act (“SEA”), which entered into force in 1987 amended, inter alia, article 8a of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (“EEC Treaty”) so that it read: “The Community shall adopt 
measures with the aim of progressively establishing the internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992. The 
internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.” The SEA is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/singleuropeanact.pdf 
31 More at: 
http://www.lavellecoleman.ie/cuuploads/editor/file/England%20and%20Wales%20pdfs/UsingEuropeanLaw2/5_%20Har
monistions%20of%20Laws.pdf 
32 See: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/institutional_and_economic_framework/ 
treaties_maastricht_en.htm. See also article 105 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) added by the Maastricht Treaty. 
The consolidated version of the TEU is available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:321E:0001:0331:EN:PDF 
33 These criteria, established by the Maastricht Treaty and referred to as the “Maastricht Criteria”, were enshrined in articles 
104 and 121(1) of the TEU, as well as in Protocol (No 20) on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, and Protocol (No 21) on 
the Convergence Criteria referred to in Article 121 of the Treaty on European Union. Such criteria may be summarized as 
follows: “1)inflation of no more than 1.5 percentage points above the average rate of the three EU member states with the 
lowest inflation over the previous year. 2) A national budget deficit at or below 3 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP) 3) National public debt not exceeding 60 percent of gross domestic product. A country with a higher level of debt 
can still adopt the euro provided its debt level is falling steadily. 4) Long-term interest rates should be no more than two 
percentage points above the rate in the three EU countries with the lowest inflation over the previous year. 5) The 
national currency is required to enter the ERM 2 exchange rate mechanism two years prior to entry [to the Euro zone]” 
http://glossary.reuters.com/index.php/Maastricht_Criteria  
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Lisbon – the Market State Takes Shape  
Lisbon is an eminently early market-state era treaty. While it continues the European tendency to 
replicate the structure of the nation-state at the integrated area level, it does not hesitate to give the 
European polity powers that nation-state Statecraft could never have tolerated be transferred from the 
nation. Lisbon gives Europe an important foreign policy unified voice. It consolidates it into a legal 
personality that will make it easier to accede to agreements and international institutions. It gives more 
power to the European Parliament while making qualified majority at the Council level the default. It 
transfers to the European Court jurisdiction over areas that are traditionally associated with the nation-
state’s competence in the previous Statecraft age. It further Europeanizes human rights by 
strengthening the legal status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. It increases the coordination 
between national and European institutions, strengthens the concept of subsidiarity, and moves Europe 
theoretically further down the role of a quasi-Federal entity. But it did not properly lay the ground for 
the development of a European Civil Code, as we will demonstrate. 
Altogether, these developments are consistent with the diffuseness of an integrated area that arose out 
of its nation-state iteration, in the early age of the market-state evolution. They reflect attempts to 
shore up the collective whole by strengthening the power of its institutions and loosening the decision-
making capacities, all the while addressing some of the remnants of the nation-stage age issues, such 
as the democracy deficit.  
In this respect, Lisbon is most conspicuous for what it does not include: a coordination of budget and 
tax policies in the integrated single market for goods, services, capital, and persons. These aspects of 
integration are some of the last frontiers of the dismantlement of nation-state welfare. Welfare 
entitlements depend on the budget and tax choices made by the nation-state. While the Eurozone 
nation-states of Europe committed to a certain degree of convergence, Europe fell short of unifying or 
harmonizing budget and tax choices. The nation-state’s reflex, whether it is expressed in French 
strikes to protest the proposed lowering of the retirement age or Greek debt issuance, evidently does 
not allow Europe to strip its members of welfare entitlements sovereignty at this early market-state 
age.  
The situation just described is akin to the state-nation reflex of the post-World War I era that 
prevented the emerging nation-states from trading among themselves based on comparative advantage 
and the preservation of sovereignty. Architecturally, Europe had to shed its mercantilist skin in 
exchange for an economically collaborative one. Today, Europe must begin to shed its national 
welfare entitlements skin and trade it in for a market-state budget and tax policy that will inevitably 
cut deep into the welfare entitlements programs of the 20th century. Failure to do so will lead to 
existential crises akin to the trade wars of the 1920s and 1930s. The reason is this: in a diffuse and 
intertwined market, the welfare entitlements choices made by one national component reverberate and 
threaten those made by others. The Greek and Irish debt crises illustrate this claim. 
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Part II: European Private Law 
We want to demonstrate how the European Union, being understood as a market state, affects the 
private legal order (Privatrechtsordnung) of the Member States and the design of the emerging 
European private legal order.34 We argue that the national private legal orders maybe equated with the 
pre-modern state nation and later the nation state of the 20th century, whereas the emerging European 
private law Europe maybe equated with the EU market state. We use the distinction between the inner 
and the outer space as a blueprint. In the inner space of the Internal Market, the EU is building 
smoothly but steadily a genuine private law that must be kept distinct from nation state codifications.  
In the outer space the EU market state and the MS nation states are engaged in a battle over 
competences, which seems to challenge our hypothesis of a strong correlation between the inner and 
the outer space of the EU. However, it will have to be shown that the competence battles are largely of 
an ideologically character that do not impede the development of a European private law beyond the 
EU.  
Our argument is based on a particular understanding of private law (meaning  “economic law”) that 
reaches beyond nation state categories of private legal orders. Only such a broadened frame opens the 
way to understanding this evolution. The transformation happens over time, takes various forms and it 
is not homogeneous. The process begins with the Single European Act. We will use four parameters 
for getting to grips with the tensions between the nation state private legal orders and the market state 
European private law: conflict and resistance, intrusion and substitution, hybridisation and 
convergence. 
 
Traditional Nation State Private Law vs. Modern European Market State Private Law 
Private law is understood as economic law,35 covering not only contract and tort or systematically 
speaking the continental codifications but also public and private regulation of the economy. The 
broad understanding of private law is crucial for the development of a deeper understanding of the 
ongoing transformation process in the EU. The traditional national private legal orders with its focus 
on contract and tort present the nation-state variant of private law. They have emerged and they are 
deeply rooted in the state nation and nation state building process of the 18th and 19th century in 
continental Europe. International private law formed the conceptual answer to decide on the applicable 
law in cross-border transactions.  
European Union private law is different. The European Union is not a state, at least not a nation state 
or a state of nations. What makes the discourse on the European Constitution, with a big or a small 
‘c’,36 difficult is the fact that the conceptual design of the EU legal order is so deeply entrenched by 
nation state constitutional patterns, overlooking the potential of the ongoing transformation process, as 
has been shown above.37 The debate (now over ten yrars old) over the feasibility of a European Civil 
Code38 fits neatly into such a distorted perspective, which is just a mirror image of the constitutional 
                                                     
34 In order to avoid the always odd reference to own contributions, we mention those who form the background to this paper 
once, H.-W. Micklitz, The Visible Hand of European Private Law, in Yearbook of European Law 2009, volume 28, P. 
Eeckhout/T. Tridimas (eds.), 2010, 3-60. 
35 Assmann/G. Brüggemeier/D. Hart/Ch. Joerges, Zivilrecht als Teil des Wirtschaftsrechts, 1980. 
36 N. Walker, ‘Big ‘C’ or small ‘c’’, (2006) 12 ELJ 12-14. 
37 J. Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas, Ein Essay, 2011, Edition suhrkamp. 
38 The official start might be dated back to the Communication of the European Commission, although the European 
Parliament had been advocating for a European Civil Code already since the early 1990s. 
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debate. The 2001 document of the European Commission, enumerated mainly European international 
private law and consumer contract law directives. The first category is conceptually speaking no more 
than a European variant of long-standing attempts at the international level to agree on common 
standards on how the applicable law should be determined. Consumer law had raised more awareness 
being the gateway for the European Union to instrumentalize consumer contract law for completing 
the internal market, long before the discussion on a European Civil Code started. The second source of 
inspiration constituted the nation state private legal orders. Perhaps not thinking but discussing private 
law in categories of the nation state must cast a blind eye to the development of private law outside 
nation state formed categories. Not being a state, the European Union was never concerned with the 
underpinnings of national private law, with private autonomy or freedom of contract. In the 
completion of the Internal Market the European Union appears as a regulator, be it through the ECJ 
which is challenging national economic rules that hinder free trade of products, services, capital or 
persons or be it through the EU legislator which is adopting horizontal or vertical market related rules 
on private transactions, often by way of new modes of governance.39 Regulatory private law, in its 
negative variant through the impact of the four freedoms on the private law and in its positive variant 
through the bulk of EU rules that have been adopted in the aftermath of the Single European Act 
outside Consumer and Anti-discrimination Law, serves the EU market state now comes clear. This 
private law is different from national private legal orders which based on private autonomy and free 
will, it is a private law which takes its form, its procedure and its content from being instrumentalised 
for building and shaping markets.40  
There is an obvious argument against such a distinction between nation states being equated with 
contract and tort law, with freedom of contract and private autonomy and European private law being 
regulatory in nature meant to design markets. Regulation in private law has been discussed already for 
more than hundred years. Otto v. Gierke is among those who criticised the distinction between formal 
private law of the pre-morden state and private law regulation, which contained the nucleus for what 
should become the welfare state in the 20th century.  
Regulatory law in the late 19th century was mainly labour and social law which was kept outside the 
BGB. Today’s regulatory private law cuts across all sectors of economic policies. In particular, it lies 
at the heart of service contracts on financial services, on telecommunications, on energy (electricity, 
gas), on (the increasingly privatised) health care services, last but not least on transport which amount 
for 70 % of the gross income in the EU. The driving force behind all these rules that aim mainly at 
opening up markets, at establishing competition, at liberalising former public services, at promoting 
privatisation in former areas of public services, is undoubtedly the EU, more precisely the European 
Commission. Private law issues tie in only in between other more ‘important aspects’ of the 
appropriate market design. This private law is regulatory law, but “regulatory” should not be equated 
with rules that restrict private autonomy and freedom of contract. Its instrumental character shields 
them from easy classification. Regulatory private law may contain both elements, establishing market 
freedoms, therefore increasing private autonomy, while at the same time providing for rules that set 
boundaries to the newly created market autonomy.41  
The regulator of hundred years ago was the nation state, which used its regulatory power to shape 
national markets for national economies. The establishment of the European Economic Community in 
1957 changed the economic, political and social environments. Nowadays it is the EU which has 
garnered the necessary support at all institutional levels to adopt regulatory measures. The relevant 
pieces of secondary Community law address economic actors, business and consumers, who are ready 
                                                     
39 Cafaggi/Muir Watt, F. Cafaggi/H. Muir Watt (eds.), Making European Private Law, 2008; same authors The Regulatory 
Functions of European Private Law, 2010. 
40 In the German understanding private law as economic law, Privatrecht als Wirtschaftsrecht, see for Europe Ch. Schmidt, 
Die Instrumentalisierung des Europäischen Privatrechts durch die Europäische Union, 2010. 
41 As prominently designed in the White Paper of the Completion of the Internal Market COM (1985) 310 final. 
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to invest into a market that offers more opportunities and better choices on both sides. The legislative 
means and regulatory tools, not to speak of the particular content of the rules, inherently bear a 
crossborder dimension. This might explain why the EU has to ‘invent’ new devices that fit overall 
policy objectives. 
 
Four Parameters for Analysing the Transformation within the EU 
The four categories are meant to capture the set of variants available in the relationship between nation 
state private law and market state European private law.42 They share a common theoretical 
background in legal theories of private law as economic law43 and theories analysing private law 
beyond the state44 and in institutional economics. We have identified four parameters which 
tentatively allow us to describe and analyse the interaction between nation state private law regimes 
and market state European private law regimes: conflict and resistance, intrusion and substitution, 
hybridisation and convergence. Without any attempt to explain the deeper reasons behind each 
category, we will use them in a rather pragmatic way to clarify the relationship between nation state 
private law and market state European private law. 
(1) Conflict and resistance:45 This is suggested as one of the possible reactions of the Member 
States. The perspective is that the Member States do not give way to the intruding European 
regulatory private law. Instead, they provoke a clash between the European regulatory private law 
and the national law and set limits to where the intruding law ends and where the national laws 
begin.  
In defending the national private legal order, more precisely national civil codes, Member States 
defend nation states patterns. The political and academic reactions in the Member States on the 
feasibility of a European Civil Code provide ample evidence for such an understanding. Even the 
academic world is divided between the ‘believers’ and the ‘opponents’. The discourse sometimes 
evinces a degree of hostility.46 With the adoption of the draft Regulation on a Common European 
Sales Law (CESL) the remnants of the European civil code project reaches the political agenda in the 
Council of Ministers, in the European and national Parliaments. Parliaments of seven Member States 
have raised objections against the draft Regulation mainly for lack of competence. Whilst this does not 
suffice to stop the initiative under the rules of the Treaty, it provides evidence of strong resistance in a 
considerable number of Member States against any attempt of the EU to intervene into the core of the 
nation states private legal orders, i.e. into sales law.  
                                                     
42 The following is no more than a snapshot of the theoretical background that guides our analysis. This is not the right place 
to explain the deeper reasons. For the purpose of this paper, we will simply ‘use’ and ‘apply’ what we have developed 
elsewhere. 
43 L. Raiser, Die Zukunft des Privatrechts, 1971. 
44 R. Michaels/N. Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, (54) American 
Journal of Comparative Law 2006, p. 843. 
45 See for a deeper understanding B. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism, Past to Present, Local to Global, (30) 
Sydney Law Review, 375; D. Caruso The Missing View of the Cathedral: The Private Law Paradigm of European Legal 
Integration, ELJ (3) 1997, 3; L. Niglia, The non-Europeanisation of Private Law ERPL 4 (2001) 575. 
46 E.g. F Yves Leqeutte, Quelques remarques à propos du projet de code civil européen de Monsieur von Bar, Recueil 
LeDalloz 2002, 2202-14; Bénedicte Fauvarque-Cosson, Faut-il un code civil européen?, Revue Trimestrielle De Droit 
Civil 2002, 463; also, Droit européen des contracts: première réaction au plan dáction de la Commission, Receuil le 
Dalloz 2003, 1171; Ph. Malinvaud, Réponse-hors délai- à la Commission européene: à propos d’un code européen des 
contracts, Receuil La Dalloz 2002, 2542-51; Jean Heut, Nous faut-il un ‘euro’ droit civil? Receuil La Dalloz 2002, 2611-
14; P. Legrand, Antivonbar, Journal of Comparative Law 1 2006, 13 
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(2) Intrusion and substitution:47 This is suggested to be the perspective of the current EU law-
making and law enforcement strategies, enshrined in the idea of a self-sufficient order composed 
of three major elements: (1) the horizontal and vertical sectoral rules; (2) the general principles 
enshrined in the horizontal and vertical sectoral rules; (3) the general principles of civil law.48 
Regulatory private law is the blueprint for understanding the transformation process. The EU is 
bypassing the nation states and developing its own design for a market based private legal order, an 
enabling legal order. The standard model for private law as a self-sufficient order is the sectorial rules 
on telecommunication, energy, financial services and transport. Self-sufficiency means the whole 
process of law-making up to law enforcement follows sector specific patterns. The Member States 
have given way to substitution and intrusion by adopting generations of secondary community law (1st, 
2nd and 3rd between 1986-2010) rules which aim at establishing a European market for 
telecommunication, for energy and for transport. When the EU implements rules into national law are 
usually kept distinct from the codified national private legal orders. They are enshrined in national acts 
that leave the structure of the EU regulatory approach intact, which means leaves market access rules 
and private law rules intact. Some Member States have compiled consumer law in a separate code, 
most of them integrate the relevant rules sector by sector into their national legislation.  
(3) Hybridisation:49 This is suggested to be an overall normative model of a composite legal order, 
within which the European and the national legal orders both play their part in some sort of a 
merged European-national private legal order. Hybridisation means that the legal character of the 
respective rule is neither European nor national. It bears elements of both legal orders and is 
therefore supposed to be hybrid.  
From an historical perspective, this is an old form of the co-existence of different legal patterns. The 
colonial experience provides ample evidence for hybrid legal orders. In modern times hybridisation 
characterises the relationship between private legal orders and constitutions. In view of the envisaged 
analysis, one might understand hybridisation as a means to leave space for nation state private legal 
orders and self-standing market state private legal order(s). Understood in this way, hybridisation can 
be found mainly in the so-called “constitutionalisation” of private law. The development started 
decades ago in the Member States, when national courts referred to constitutional rights to intervene 
into classical private law cases, mainly in order to enhance the importance of social rights in private 
law matters.50 The ECJ, as well as the ECtHR, have begun an ever stronger form to use human rights 
and since 2000 fundamental rights as a means to enhance the position of the individual be it against his 
or her state, be it horizontally in private law relations.51 The result is a hybrid order, where nation state 
remedies form the ground which is then be examined against European fundamental and human rights.  
                                                     
47 The link to system theory is obvious, though not sufficient, see G. Teubner, Self-subversive Justice: Contingency or 
Transcendence Formula of Law, 72 MLR 2009, 1. 
48 ECJ 10.4.2008 Case C-412/06 – Hamilton, at 42; AG Trstenjak, Case C-489/07 Messner, at 91 and 108, ECJ at 29; 15.10. 
2009 Case C-101/08 – Audiolux ECR 2009 I-nyr; J. Basedow, Mangold, Audiolux und die allgemeinen Grundsätze des 
europäischen Privatrechts, Festschrift für K. Hopt 2010, 27; St. Weatherill, The 'principles of civil law' as a basis for 
interpreting the legislative acquis, ERCL 2010, 74; A. Hartkamp, 'The General Principles of EU Law and Private Law', 
RabelsZ 2011, 241. 
49 Th. Duve, An Early Globalization of Justice? Historical observations on mechanisms of creating normative coherence in 
the Age of Discovery, paper presented at the University of Helsinki, September 2011; I.-J. Sand, Hybrid Law – Law in a 
Global Society of ifferentiation and Change, in: Gralf-Peter Calliess; Andreas Fischer-Lescano; Dan Wielsch and Peer 
Zumbansen (eds.): Soziologische Jurisprudenz: Festschrift für Gunther Teubner, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 871-886. 
50 O. Cherednychenko, Fundamental Rights, Contract Law and the Protection of the Weaker Party: A Comparative Analysis 
of the Constitutionalisation of the Contract Law with Emphasis on Risky Financial Transactions, doctoral dissertation – 
Utrecht University, 2008; Ch. Mak, Fundamental Rights in European Contract Law. A Comparision of the Impact of 
Fundamental Rights on Contractual Relationships in Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and England, Alphen aan den Rijin: 
Kluwer Law International, 2008. 
51 N. Reich, Horizontal Liability in EC Law – Hybridisation of Remedies for Compensation in Case of Breach of EC Rights, 
CMLR 2007 (44) 704. 
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(4) Convergence:52 This is suggested to be a process of mutual approximation of the two different 
legal orders, of nation state based legal orders and market based legal order(s). They are not 
merged like in the concept of hybridisation, they still exist side by side, but they are drawing 
nearer to each other. Convergence is not bound to mandatory standards and default rules. It instead 
enshrines in particular the new modes of governance, co-regulation and self-regulation, which are 
enhanced by limited and limiting state powers. 
The market state concept opens up space for private regulation, i.e. for private actors and private 
regulation.53 The theoretical debate on convergence is very advanced, however; it still focuses too 
much on statutory law making or more precisely on EU law making via directives and regulations. 
The inherent assumption of all EU law making is that harmonisation of private law rules via top-down 
binding directives and regulations increases  convergence. The counter position is most prominently 
documented in the Jus Commune series edited by W. v. Gerven. Here the idea is that the courts are the 
key players in paving the way for convergence via a mutual learning process. We start from the 
premise that convergence is easier to manage and to realise in areas where private actors dominate, 
e.g. standardisation of services via national and European standards bodies. Private regulation is older 
than the state nation (lex mercatoria). That is why there is a link between the old state nation patterns 
(and its predecessors) and new emerging market state.54 
The current state of affairs - the intermingling of nation state private legal orders and the emerging EU 
market state - could be summed up in the following overview which nicely demonstrates that we are 
observing an ongoing process of change where different patterns and different variations of the state 
stand side-by-side.  
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Self-sufficiency 
Market state 
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state side by-side 
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52 W. van Gerven, Private Law in a Federal Perspective, in R. Brownword/H.-W. Micklitz/L. Niglia/St. Weatherill (eds.), 
The Foundations of European Private Law, Hart Publishing, 2011, 337; Legrand, The Impossibility of Legal Transplants, 
4 Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 111 1997, Th. Wilhelmsson, The Contract Law Acquis – Towards More Coherence 
Through Generalisation, Europäischer Juristentag, 4 (1), 111-145. 
53 F. Cafaggi (ed.) Reframing Self-Regulation in European Private Law, 2006.  
54 See on this issue N. Jansen, Legal Pluralism in Europe, National Laws, European Legislation, and Non-legislative 
Codification, in L. Niglia (ed.), Pluralism and European Private Law, Hart publishing 2012, forthcoming. 
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The Interaction between the Inner and the Outer Space of Nation State Private Law and Market 
State European Market State Private Law 
The answer to the question of the interaction between the inner and the outer space of private law 
might in the EU market state might be a straightforward ‘no’, as Member States will claim that private 
law in the outer space of the EU lies in their hands be it in the traditional or the modern variant.  In 
traditional private law, Member States co-ordinate their private legal orders outside the EU within 
‘The Hague Conference of Private International Law’,55 or they unify contract law through 
international agreements such as the Vienna Convention. This clear picture becomes blurred through 
CESL which if adopted would compete with the Vienna Convention, just Latin American or Asean 
(Japan, Korea, China) models of enhanced co-operation in nation state private law. It would make the 
EU an international player and competitor over the search for the best legal order. The picture seems 
similar in sector related rules in areas such as telecommunications, financial services, transport, to 
some extent energy, or sports (football, Olympic Games), health and safety regulation in the area of 
pharmaceuticals (WHO), chemicals (FAO/UNEP), pesticides (FAO/UNEP), foodstuff (FAO/Codes 
Alimentarius) and consumer goods (ISO/IEC). Like in traditional nation state private law, Member 
States claim that any involvement at the international level, even under the integration of the EU, has 
to go through their hands, leaving the EU with a back stage role. The fortress Europe – the inner space 
of European (regulatory) private law – looks from the outside like a coherent block, the outer space of 
European (regulatory) private law like an integral part, if any, of an international legal order where the 
EU has no say. The result would then be that the space for European private law remains limited to the 
inner world of the EU, whereas the outer space remains dominated by the Member States in both 
areas, traditional and modern private law. 
Competence is key. Whether or not the European Union may become involved in private law making 
and enforcement (!) outside the EU depends on areas of both nation state private law and market state 
European law on whether it has the competence to engage in negotiations maybe even conclusion of 
international agreements which bind the Member States. The EU law on external relations can be 
characterised as a longstanding battle over competences, with the EU constantly attempting to extend 
its powers via Treaty amendments and/or with the help of the European Court of Justice, whereas the 
Member States hesitate – to put it in cautious terms – to “delegate sovereignty” to the EU level. The 
competence rules of the Treaty, read together with the relevant case-law of the ECJ, tell a different 
story, one where there could and might be much more coherence between the inner and the outer space 
of European regulatory private law, one where the market state has gained ground even outside the EU 
borders, but where there is still room for nation state private legal orders in the traditional field of 
private law. In order to verify our thesis of the existing interlink we need to look into the EU powers in 
external relations, both in traditional nation state contract and tort law (the codifications) and the 
market state European regulatory private law. This requires a short excursion into competence rules, 
linked to the different substance of European private law (traditional and regulatory).  
Within the EU, the scenario looks like this: Traditional private law matters (e.g., the harmonisation of 
contract and tort – the core of national private legal orders) is mainly and mostly subject to attempts of 
the European Union to Europeanise international private law rules via Art. 81 TFEU (jurisdiction, 
applicable law and transborder enforcement of judgments). The EU enjoys no competence in the core 
areas of private law, contract and tort. Measures to set common standards in the area of regulatory 
private law are based either on Art. 114 TFEU (consumer law, telecommunications, energy, financial 
services) or Art. 91/100 TFEU (transport). CESL represents the first attempt to use Art. 114 TFEU to 
regulate traditional private law matters, though in a transborder context.  
                                                     
55 http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php 
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Outside the EU the situation is more complex. The implied power doctrine, as developed by the ECJ,56 
suggests that whenever the EU has succeeded in regulating (regulatory) private law matters within the 
EU under whatever competence rule (Art. 80, 91/100, 114 TFEU), it has also obtained the power to 
engage in negotiations and international agreements in external relations in that very same field. This 
power has to be shared with the Member States in so far as the measures adopted internally strive for 
minimum harmonisation only. In Lugano the ECJ57 confirmed the implied power doctrine with regard 
to Art. 81 TFEU, in the core area of Member States competences and of nation state private legal 
orders. The Lisbon Treaty extended the powers of the EU in the area of the Common Commercial 
policy considerably. Art. 133 TFEU grants the EU exclusive powers not only for the regulation of 
goods but also for services. Setting aside the relationship between the implied power doctrine and Art. 
133 we assume that this extension must be regarded as another building block in shaping the EU as a 
market state.  
So far, only the regulation of investment services has raised the attention of the Member States with an 
interest in making sure in the Lisbon Treaty that the enlarged competences of the EU are not used to 
affect the existing bilateral investment treaties.58 The legislative developments in the economically 
most important area of services where the European Union has obtained powers internally via Art. 114 
TFEU and externally via the implied power doctrine and now via Art. 133 TFEU has not yet reached 
the political agenda, maybe because the European Commission has not yet clarified in which way and 
where it will use these powers. Looing into traditional private law and modern regulatory law and 
linking them to the powers of the European Union internally and externally, the interlink between the 
competences becomes clear. The devided world of traditional vs. modern private law in the inner 
space is mirrored in the outer space of the EU. The way is free to develop a European private law that 
reaches beyond the territories of the EU, thereby circumventing the role and function of nation states 
private legal orders. 
                                                     
56 ECJ, Case 22/70 Commission v. Council (AETR/ERTA) (1971) ECR 263 at 19; generally M. Cremona, External Relations 
and External Competence of the European Union: The Emergence of an Integrated Policy, in P. Craig/G. de Burca (eds), 
The Evolution of EU Law, Chapter 9, OUP 2nd Edition 2011, p. 217, at 219 ff. 
57 ECJ 7.2.2006, Opinion 1/2003 (Lugano II). 
58 See the strong statement of the GCC in the Lisbon judgment at 370 et seq.;  
 http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html  
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Fields of private law in 
the Member States 
EU Internal powers EU External powers Fields of private law at 
the international level 
Code Civil 
Code Civil, Codice 
Civile, Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch 
Contract and tort 
(common law) 
Art. 114 
Mainly consumer law 
directives, product 
liability, few commercial 
law, but now CESL 
Implied power  
Minimum harmonisation 
(shared powers) 
Full harmonisation 
(exclusive power) 
Vienna Convention on 
Sales Law 
International private law 
a) jurisdiction 
b) applicable law 
c) mutual 
recognition  
Art. 81 
a) Reg. 44/2001 
b) Reg. 864/2007; 
593/2008 
c) Reg. 44/2001 
Implied power 
Lugano 1/2006 
(exclusive power) 
The Hague Convention 
Regulatory private law 
Energy, 
 
financial services, 
telecommunications, 
transport 
Art. 114 
 
Art. 114 (now Art. 00 
 
Art. 114 
 
Art. 91/100 
Competences 
a) Implied power 
doctrine Art. 
114  
b) Art. 133 services 
(exclusive 
powers) 
Multilateral and bilateral 
sector-related 
international agreements 
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Four Parameters for Analysing the Transformation outside the EU 
The transfer of the four parameters of conflict and resistance, substitution and intrusion, hybridisation 
and convergence from the inner to the outer world of the EU paves the way for a deeper understanding 
of conditions under which the EU is acting or may be acting as a market state and where it leaves 
space for traditional nation state patterns of behaviour. Our tentative hypothesis is that the EU takes a 
strong stand as a market state, whenever it is truly economically important whereas it gives way to 
nation states behaviour in more ideological charged fields. 
Conflict and resistance: the counterpart to the established nation state private legal orders is the ‘The 
Hague Convention on International Private Law’. The conventions adopted in that frame do not affect 
the substance of the nation state private legal orders. The general idea behind this is that the 
international rules shall balance out conflicts between different jurisdictions, the old Savigny ideal. 
The opinion of the ECJ in Lugano tilts the balance between the Member States and the EU. Granting 
exclusive competence to the EU must be understood as a big ‘blow’ to the finely tuned web of 
intertwined competences in the area of international private law. In a way it is the logical consequence 
of the harmonisation of European international private law rules in the Brussels and the two Rome 
Regulations, although the latter two have been adopted after the Lugano opinion.59 Following this line 
of argument, the EU would become the sole actor in weaving the web that ties the nation state private 
legal orders together. However, the European Commission is not making use of that new power. In the 
first occasion offered to benefit from its exclusive power in the field of international private law, it 
behaved as if the EU and the Member States enjoy joint power.60 One might argue that there is a 
difference between an established concept of joint power and a voluntary practice which leaves the 
last word and the last decision always in the hands of the European Commission. One might also argue 
that the European Commission intends to mitigate the heavy impact of the Lugano opinion, thereby 
avoiding new competence battles. What matters much more is, however, that the European 
Commission is so generous because international private law issues do not rank high on its policy 
agenda. The practical and economic importance is limited. Member States may defend their turfs; 
international private law does not really affect the task of the EU market state in the international 
economy. The EU is focusing on the regulation of services which currently are driving the economy. 
Substitution and intrusion: In the area of telecommunications, energy and financial services, health 
and safety regulation, the European Commission keeps a rather low profile, although we know little 
about the role and function the European Commission is actually playing. Until now, it has not 
referred to the implied power doctrine in these three sectors in order to claim competence in 
international agreements. Air transport, however, is the exception to the rule. The European 
Commission used the infringement procedure to claim and in the end to gain exclusive competence in 
that domain.61 The visible result is the so-called Open Sky Agreements (OSA) concluded by the 
European Union, not only but mainly with the United States of America. One may wonder whether 
and to what extent the OSA can and might serve as a blueprint for action in the field of 
telecommunication, energy and financial services. Setting energy apart, the European Commission is 
already playing a key role in the external regulation of telecommunication, financial services as well 
as health and safety. This is so quite independent of the question whether the European Commission is 
being granted exclusive or shared competence, of whether the European Commission has no formal 
                                                     
59 The ECJ decided on the 7.2.2006, Rome II was adopted on the 11.7.2007, Rome I on the 17.6.2008. 
60 OJ L 2009 L 200, 13.2009, 25 Regulation 662/2009 establishing a procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of 
agreements between Member States and third countries on particular matters concerning the law applicable to contractual 
and non-contractual obligations; see J.-J. Kuipers, The Exclusive Competence of the Community under Art. 81 TFEU: 
Lugano re-opened, in M. Cremona/M.J. Monar/S. Poli (eds). The External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice, P. Lang, 2011, p. 287. 
61 See A. Heritier/Y. Karagiannis (2011) The New institutions of Transatlantic Aviation, Global Policy, 2, 2, 152-62  
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competence at all, or has obtained only an observer status. There is much research to be done in order 
to get a clear picture of the role and function of the EU in these market sectors. In all these areas the 
European Commission is involved in international (soft-law) making outside formal conventions. it is 
working as a catalyst all too often between the United States (nearly always supported by the UK) and 
the other Member States of the EU. We would call this a typical market state behaviour. The European 
Commission is enabling the opening of markets, to the benefit of the companies in Europe, sometimes 
against the resistance or the reluctance of their host countries. 
Hybridisation: Constitutionalisation of private law in the external dimension of the EU is associated 
with the increasing role human rights/fundamental rights are playing. There is little knowledge 
available on the degree to which human rights are used to influence the external dimension of 
European private law issues, be it traditional nation state private law (international private law) or 
European regulatory private law. So far this question has never been systematically investigated. Case 
law of the ECJ does not (yet) provide for much guidance.62 One striking though rather old example is 
the so-called export of hazardous products from the EU to non-EU member States. At the culmination 
point of the debate in the 1980s the promoters of a home state responsibility for export outside 
national territories invoked human rights to justify and to legitimate the exterritorial responsibility of 
nation state be it as part of the national constitution be it as imposed via an international human right 
to safety.63 Outside and beyond health and safety issues we do not have much evidence on the possible 
role and function of human rights in the external dimension of European (regulatory) private law. This 
might change once the EU has officially joined the European Convention of Human Rights. 
Hybridisation would lead to a composite order of European private law rules in external relations 
combined with the Convention of Human Rights. In the past the European Union played a rather 
active role in promoting human rights in external relations. Again this is in line with the 
transformation process within the EU.64 
Convergence: following the scenario at the inner EU level, one may start from the premise that the 
European Commission is playing and might play an ever-increasing role in the new modes of 
international governance that is so predominant in the regulation of services. In the aftermath of the 
1985 ‘New Approach to Technical Standards and Regulation’, the European Commission established 
a European standards body in the field of telecommunication, it developed and fine-tuned the 
comitology procedure, and invented the Lamfalussy procedure. These new forms of governance are 
particularly open to internationalisation processes. The EU is then well placed to connect the inner EU 
world to the outer international world. The very open and less legalised mechanisms leave substantial 
leeway for input from outside the EU which could easily be organised by the European Commission. 
The new modes of governance have attracted great attention in particular within the EU. In the last 
couple of years, the transnational dimension of this new modes of governance have raised concern, 
theoretically under different headings such as ‘private law beyond the state’, global administrative 
law,65 transnational law,66 lex mercatoria67 or transnational private regulation.68 These projects have in 
                                                     
62 One might with some imagination read the Kadi logic (ECJ C-402/05P and C-415/05 P 2008 ECR I-6351 into the TNT 
judgment ECJ 4.5.2010, Case C-533/08 TNT v. AXA, 2010 ECR I-nyr at 49, where the ECJ strongly argued that 
international commercial law rules must be ‘equivalent’ to the EU rules. However, in TNT the ECJ does not refer to 
Kadi. 
63 H.-W. Micklitz, International Regulation and Control of the Production and Use of Chemicals and Pesticides: Perspectives 
for a Convention, Michigan Journal of International Law, 3, (1992), 653-697. 
64 M Cremona and B de Witte (eds.) EU Foreign Relations Law – Constitutional Fundamentals, Hart Publishing, 2008. 
65 B. Kingsbury/N. Krisch/R.B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, Law and Contemporary Problems 
68 (2005) 15. 
66 G.-P. Calliess/P. Zumbansen, Rough Consensus Running Code, 2009. 
67 J. W. Smith, Mercantile Law (ed. Hart and Simey, 1905), in favour K-P. Berger, The New Law Merchant and the Global 
Market Place – A 21st Century View of Transnational Commercial Law, http://www.trans-lex.org/000002. 
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common that they link theoretical concepts to empirical evidence or empirical research. However, the 
European Union and its role in the various areas of services remain under-investigated.  start from the 
hypothesis that the European Union is playing a very active role in these new modes of governance, 
though striving for keeping a rather low profile. These new forms of governance form the perfect 
ground for strengthening the market state profile of the EU. 
 
 
 
(Contd.)                                                                    
68 C. Scott/F. Cafaggi/L. Senden (eds.) The Challenge of Transnational Private Regulation Conceptual and Constitutional 
Debates, Journal of Law and Society Special Issues, 2011. 
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